Inn-oductlon
Multi-attribute utility theory ([van Neumann 1947\. [Fishburn 1970J) has long been an important tool for classical decision makings. Together with the rational homo economicu1 model, it has received numerous criticisms (e.g. [ Simon 1947J, [Edwards 1954\, etc) . Indeed, in the reality of subjective decision making, individuals as the decision makers can seldom afford to select among several alternatives (as in [ Tversky 1972J, for instance). Instead, a. primarily bivalent conclusion is often needed for the particular case under consideration. Besides, very often the rich body of causal relations between the factors and the decision is lost in the simple, conventional model of faetors weighting (e.g. [ Fishburn 1967\. [ Yager 1977 ). To address these issues, in this paper, we shall de-emphasize the aspect of optimal choice in the decision, and elaborate the sophisticated process of case analysis and evaluations. To this end, the earlier studies of confirmation (e.g. [Carnap 1950] ) become more relevant in spirit (but not to the extent of their appeal to probabilities, for reasons presented in the next section.)
Since we concentrate on the decision making as a process of subjective judgement, the burgeoning fi eld of expert systems naturally provides many useful insights. In particular, early sys tems like MYCIN [ Shortliffe 1976 [ (which will be frequently referred to in the sequel,) and PROSPECTOR [ Duda 197\lj have explored various relationships between the evidence and the hypothesis. Lately, the theoretical works by [Dempster 1967\ and [ Shafer 1976J that extend probability theories have received wide attention for their capability of capturing incomplete and uncertain knowledge. (See section 3.)
Recently, from a different a.ngle, [ Cohen 1983 [ has a.rgued that the straightforward numerica.l representation �annot discriminate kinds of causa.tive situations. Therefore a decision system that remains entirely numerical cannot catch the deep meaning of factor causality. In part, this argument coincides with our previ ous criticism against the conventional factor-weighting mechan ism. However, between the two extremes of plain numerical calculation and pure symbolic manipulation, (which Cohen's work rested on,) we envisage a great deal of latitude for improvement; On the one hand, we acknowledge that different pieces of evidence do exhibit distinct natures, therefore reck lessly massaging them into a single number without regard to this heterogeneity is oversimplistic. On the other hand, we also regard aggrega. ting different factors as an indispensable capability for an intelligent system to reach conclusions.
It is from this stand that we shall present this pa per.
Factors and Evidence
During the process of analysis and judgement, we recognize the existence of a subjective tendency in granting the decision. (At this moment we content ourselves with the intuitive meaning.) In addition, the decision tendency will change as the situation presents it.<!elf by means of different factors. As mentioned in the introduction, the causal relations are manyfold between the facThe author is also with the Computer Science Division, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.
tors and the subjective tendency to granting the decision before and after acknowledging a factor. In order to describe these rela tions, we introduce the following notations:
H : that the decision maker will make a positive decision on the candidate under consideration; F is V: a factor F takes the value V; (This factor-value association generalizes the bivalent judgement in which a piece of fact F=V0 would be either true or false. The reason for this generalization is that usually it is not only the factor existing or not that counts, but also how the factor exists. As a matter of fact, diff e. rent factor values can change the way it infl uences the decision; in other words, they may change the role this factor is playing. Similar concepts on this many-valued variable were formalized in a variable-valued logic calculus VL 1 for an expert system on soybean disease diagnosis.
Bei(H jE): the prior degree of belief that H should be true, given some other knowledge E irrelevant of F. In other words, Bei(H jE) expresses the subjective ten dency of the decision maker to grant a positive decision; (It should be noted that we are not following the Baye sian theory, therefore Bel(H�) doesn't obey the usual Bayesian rule of conditioning for probabilities:
Bei(E) A better interpretation in light of Dempster and Shafer's works will be presented in the sequel.)
Bei(H IE,F is V): the posterior degree of belief that H should be true, given E and the incremental knowledge that F is V;
It was pointed out earlier that Bei(H IE) should not be equated to the conditional probability Prob (HIE) -or just the prior pro bability Prob(H) in case of E being trivially true. The major dis tinction between Bei(H IE) and Prob(H IE)-assuming the latter does cognitively make sense for the moment -is that we require Bei(HIE)+Bel(HIE)::=;l in general. This being the case, one possible interpretation may be to identify Bel( H IE) with the b e/ief function in D empster-Shafer theory. Indeed, some computa tional formulae in this paper bear a close relation to their coun terparts in Dempster-Shafer theory, which will be examined in details in section 3.
The Role System of Factors
In this section, all the decision factors will first be categorized into different elementary roles (including supportive, adverse, sufficient, contrary, and necessary) or their combinations when meaningful. These different roles together constitute a role sys-
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tern that sorts out the corpus of human knowledge so that fac tors of distinct nature can be treated differently. For each of the five elementary roles, we additionally specify an intensity, indicat ing how strongly the role may affect the final decision, and two margins, signifying the valid range over which the factor would play this role. In addition, multiple roles can be played by the same factor, in which case the composite effect is amenable to a rule of superposition on the elementary roles.
(1) Supportive Factor A supportive factor doesn' t have to be present in order to grant a positive decision. In fact, the absence of a purely supportive factor should not count against the decision at all. But if the sup portive factor does exist, then it should contribute to confirming the decision with a degree of support (the intensity).
In analogy to the Measure of increased Belief (MB) in MYCIN, we have tried to capture the concept of degree of support ( SU PP) by the following equation, with the understanding that Bel( H)!:, F is V) is larger than Bel( H�) under the circumstances:
It should be noted that the degree of support is an intuitive con cept. When estimated by a decision maker, it reflects in part the cognitive structure of this person. It therefore remains charac teristic of him only. Another decision maker may very well pro vide a different value as the degree of support by the same fac tor. Contrary to the possibility that this will introduce an undesirable discrepancy from person to person, the variation accounts for the individual subjectivity that is intrinsic of a per sonal decision making.
With an estimated degree of support SUPP from the decision maker, and with two margins VL and VH (that form the valid value range I VL, VHJ), we then can completely describe the behavior of a supportive factor F by the following pair of equa tions:
The distinction between our use of the degree of support SUPP and MYCIN's measure of belief MB is now made clear: in MYCIN, although MB was defined in terms of prior and poste rior probabilities, the system never really attempted to calculate them. Instead, ad hoc formulae were invented that only involved MB' s themselves. As a result, it doesn' t really make a difference how MB was defined. In contrast, the primary con cern in this paper is to update the posterior degree of belief An adverse factor is a factor which counts against the decision, not to the full, but with a degree of adversity (i.e. the intensity). It should be pointed out that the absence of an adverse factor sim ply means that there is no disconfirmatory effect due to this fac tor. This is not to be confused with the presence of a supportive factor, in which case the degree of belief in the decision would actually be increased.
Similar to the way SUPP was defined, the degree of adversity ADV by factor F can be expressed by the following equation a Ia MYCIN, provided that Bel(Hf;, F is V) is known to be smaller than Bel(Hf;):
An interesting observation is in order at this juncture. Although the defi nitions of SUPP and ADV bear a close resemblance to the MYCIN definitions of MB and MD (Measure of increased Belief) respectively, many properties therein do not hold any more. For instance, if we read SUPP(Hf is V) as the degree of support for H by F being V, and ADV(Hf is V) as the degree of adversity against H by F being V, then it is not true that SUPP(H JF is V)=ADV(il j F is V), while in MYCIN we did have MB(H,E)=MD(il,E) for any evidence E. The primary reason for this difference comes from our requirement that Bel( H JE)+Bel( iljE) :S 1 as previously stated. Less mathemati cally neat than Prob(H JE)+Prob(HJE)=i as it may appear at fi rst, the new formalism is free from a very undesirable conse quence in MYCIN: MD(H IE)>O implies MB(H IE)>O; in other words, the absence of an adverse factor in MYCIN would amount to the presence of a supportive factor! !Yen 1985J
In regard to the man-machine interaction, the value of ADV, just like the value of SUPP, must also be solicited from the deci sion maker. With its degree of adversity determined, an adverse factor F can then be completely described in terms of its bear ings on the posterior belief as follows:
A sufficient factor is such that its confirmation alone suffices to merit an affirmative decision, but no confi rming effect will be observed if a pure sufficient factor doesn't exist. In practice, the degree of sufficiencv (SUFF) may be less than perfect. Therefore we may use the following pair of equations to characterize a sufficient factor:
Care must be taken here to distinguish a strongly supportive fac tor from its sufficient counterpart that is somewhat weak. In essence a supportive factor incrementallv adds to the total degree of belief, while a sufficient factor ensures the belief to quite a considerable degree. The reason for this distinction is that a sup portive factor, unlike its sufficient counterpart entailing by itself all the information that is needed, usually is intended to corro borate with other supportive factors. This need and capability for corroboration remains characteristic of all the supportive factors, even if a particular supportive factor is so strong that it corro borates to yield a very high degree of belief as a single sufficient factor would. Since rarely is there no need for corroborative con siderations, the supportive role is generally preferred.
( 4) Necessary Factor
The factor has to be present in order to make a positive decision. If the factor is absent, however, the belief in the decision will be reduced to nil. On the other hand, the confi rmation of a pure necessary factor does not contribute to a larger degree of belief at all.
In practice, we shall describe the behavior of a necessary factor by means of its degree of neceBsity NEC defined as:
generalizes the classical notation Prob (HIE}') and should be close to 0. Now that an estimated degree of necessity is given by the decision maker, we are then in a position to describe a necessary factor F as follows: (Remember that Fill V8 general izes FiB present , and F is VL generalizes F i8 absent (F).)
If a contrary factor is present, the degree of belief in the positive decision will be excluded. However, the absence of such a factor doesn't lead to an increased belief. Thus, a contrary factor in a sense is the negation of a necessary factor. ··similar to the degree of necessity, we can define a degree of con traries CONTR as: CO NTR=l-Bei(H \E,F is VH), which will be again solicited from the decision maker. Then the contrary factor will act up to the following pair of equations:
Although the same factor can play multiple roles, it should be noted that an intuitive rule of superposition precludes any con tradictory combination. For example, it is not allowed to have the same factor be both supportive and adverse. But a supportive role can certainly be combined with a necessary role.
Combination of Factors
In the previous section, we have studied the individual behaviors of different kinds of roles for a factor; we have also remarked that multiple roles can be played by the same factor within the realm of logical consistency. However, the issue of the joint behavior by multiple factors was not addressed. Since very rarely would there be a single-factor decision situation -even if the fac tor consists of compound statements, the study of the issue in this section thus becomes imperative.
(
1) Multiple Supportive Factors
Suppose we have two supportive factors F1 and F2 respectively defined as follows:
Our interest is to calculate the joint posterior degree of h elief, for mally Bei(H IE, F1 is VH , F2 is VH ). If we recall the meaning I 2 of Bei(H IE), this is easily answered by substituting Bei(H IE, F1 is VH) for Bei(H IE) in equation (9). After rear ! rangement, we obtain the following pair of equations for the joint belief:
It is interesting to observe that the joint degree of support SUPP obeys the following relation with the two constituent degrees of support S1 and S2:
(11) Not surprisingly, this combination method bears exactly the same functional form as the combined measures of belief in MYCIN. However, because our derivation is based on the increased belief resulting from a factor valuation, we are able to perform partiol matchings against available evidence, as will be examined in the next section. Finally, we shall just briefly remark that the sequence in combining multiple supportive fac tors does not affect the final posterior belief, due to the fact that the combination formula is both commutative and associative.
{2) Multiple Adverse Factors
Similar to the case with multiple supportive factors, suppose we have two adverse factors F1 and F2 defined by:
The question here is again to ask the value of the joint posterior degree of belief Bei(H IE, F1 is VH 1 , F2 is VH 2 ). By substitut-
we easily derive the following relations:
Just like the joint degree of support in the previous case, from (14) we can also derive a joint degree of adversity ADV in terms of A1 and A2 such that Bel(H IE, F1 is VH , F2 is VH )=Bei(H IE) X(l-ADV): (There-! 2 fore although our SUPP and ADV Jack the same symmetry with respect to H as in MB and MD, we still enjoy a.n identical combi nation method between SUPP's and ADV's respectively, hence the combination sequence for adverse factors is also commuta tive and associative.) case the supportive factor will be dilcounted by the adverse factor (Remember that equation (13) relates to the adverse factor F2).
In the second approach, however, we substitute
Bel(H IE, F2 il VH ) for Bel(H m in equation (8) . in which caae 2 we shall have the adverse factor leBitened by its supportive coun terpart. Unfortunately, the two methods will yield different results, and it can be eaaily shown that the first method alwaJIB leads to a more conservative (smaller) degree of belief. So, which is the one to chooseT It turns out that the fi rst method -supportive factors discounted by adverse ones -is better for the following two reaaons. First, it always incorporates both the supportive and the adverse effects in the calculation, regardless of the initial value of Bel(H f.:). In contraat, the second method will suppress the adverse effect in caae of the initial Bel(H �) being 0, this is because we substitute Bei(H IE, F2 i1 VH / �el(H IE):x{l-A.2)� for Bel( H f.:) in equation ( 8). Second, by using D empster-Shafer theory with appropriate interpretations it is possible to derive the same result aa in the first method. ( Our attempt to rel&te to that theory is covered in section 4.)
As a result, we shall adopt the first method to derive the joint degree of belief as follows: 
where NECMA X =maz(NE01,NEC2); by the same token, two contrary factors should act upon the joint belief according to the following pah of equations:
We have studied severa.l combinations between different factors, but we still have to determine the overall combining sequence that includes the entirety of decision factors. From previous dis cussions, it is n&tural to propose a sequence such that all suppor tive fa.ctors will be combined first, followed by successive discounts from the adverse factors. Finally the total degree of belief is either guaranteed by sufficient factors, or nullified by contrary factors, or else filtered by the necessary ones.
Partial Matching ll)' Evidence
In previous sections we have presented a role system for factors considered to be relevant by the decision maker. Although different roles assume different behaviors, it is common to all of them that the factor (as the role player) represents only a gen eric expectation beforehand. As the time comes when actually in the decision process, the judgement made on each factor really depends on the particular evidence obtained; whether done reli ably or by virtue of guesses, the "evidence" will be used to match against the corresponding factor.
This factor/evidence dichotomy can also be viewed as patterns versus data (in the terminology of pattern matching), or decision variables versus their values (in the classical theo�y). At any rate, the point is that the matching may not be perfect, therefore the asserted rule of behavior (i.e. the paired equations) may not apply to the whole. Then it is really up to the decision maker to determine the effectiveness of the original rule. If the person performs a bivalent, all-or-none matching (which we shall call a rigid judgement), then all the evidence that falls short of expecta tion will amount to nothing, no matter how small the margin is. Alternatively, the decision maker can release the rigorous con straint and employs an elastic judgement, in which case the rule of behavior will be partia/111 observed on imperfect evidence. In this paper, we assume that all the judgements are elastic. This is purely for the convenience of discussion.
Suppose a particular piece of evidence shows that F is VE in the range of factor values I VL, VH ]. As a result several cases may arise in light of the theory of measurement (e.g. ]Krantz 1971]).
The factor values may be in nominal or ordinal scale, in which case it would be difficult to reason the behavior of F is VE, short of equations for F at values other than VL or VH. How ever, if the factor values are at least in interval scale, then it makes more sense to measure how closely the evidence is present to the full degree. This measurement, which will be referred to as the evidential strength 71, may be defined by the fol lowing ratio:
(Therefore the definition of this evidential strength does general ize the rigid judgement to be more than a matter of absence/presence.) Now that we have computed 71 from the evi dence (which we shall write as F is VE), we are facilitated to reason the new rule of behavior for factor F under various cir cumstances. For instance, ifF is a supportive factor the posterior belief Bel(H�, F is V sub E ) can be estimated by a linear inter polation between the two equations in (2):
It should be noted here that the linear interpolation has been chosen mainly for its simplicity; actually other methods are also applicable. In particular, if we replace 71 by 71 n with a big n in the estimating equation (21), we are effectively simulating a rigid judgement. In fact this raise-to-powers method has been widely used in I Zadeh 1978a] and other related works to deal with vari ous degrees of stringency in semantics.
In the case when F is an adverse factor evidenced with strength 71, a linear interpolation between equations ( 4) would yield:
When it comes to sufficient factors, a linear interpolation should be taken between Bel(H�) and SUFF in the first equation of ( 5). The result then becomes
Suppose F is a necessary factor, then a linear interpolation in equations (6) gives us the following estimation:
=min(Bei(H \E), TfxBei(H \E)+(l-71)X(l-NEC))
Finally, in the case ofF being a contrary factor with strength Tf, we may obtain the following interpolated belief from {7):
Aggre gation of Evidence
In the previous section we have made a distinction between the factor and the evidence, accordingly the rules of the factor behavior were in essence discounted in proportion to the avail able evidential strengths. Note that the rule discount may be elastic to various degrees. This elasticity can be achieved by choosing the power term for interpolation. However, we shall confine ourselves to the linear case in this paper.
In mc·re general settings, just as the decision maker needs to combine multiple factors specified, he often has to aggregate pieces of evidence collected. It is this issue that we now turn to.
Consider two pieces of evidence E1: F1 is VE 1 and 
=Bel(H IE)+SUPPx{l-Bei(H IE))
with the aggregated degree of 1upport SUPP equa.I to S111+S2�-S111 XS2�.
As a possible generalization, we can redefine this SUPP to be S1+S2-S1S2x('1*d, where the two-place function '1*� is such that (1) 11*��*1'/, (2) ( '1* d*€==q*(�* €), (3) if 11'S� and ll'SV, then 11 *ll'S�•v, a.nd (4) 1*1'/==q . Then the question of appropriate function forms for 11 *� arises. It turns out that such 11 *I has been widely studied in a.rell.!l related to the fuzzy set theory, and is formally named a triangular form. (14) and (22), we shall ha.ve (27) where ADV is defined a.s A1 11+A2�-A1A2><{11•�), with the understanding that 11 *� generalizes the straightforward product term 11 X�. Now suppose factor F1 is supportive, and F2 is adverse. To com-pute the aggregated posterior belief
Bei(H IE, F1 is VE , F2 il VE ), we simply dissolve equations 1 2 (21) and (22) 
=jBei(H IE)+S1'1><{1-Bei(H IE)j x(1-A2d
When it comes to two sufficient factors, with their nature being nonaggregative, the "aggregated" belief is then establi:Jhed by simply taking the maximum of the two interpolations. Stated symbolically, we have a relation very similar to (17):
The only change is that
By the same token, if both factors F1 and F2 are necessary , we shall have the counterpart of ( 18):
with NECMAX==l-min( 11 xBei(H IE)+(1-11) X(1-NEC1), �xBei(H jE)+(1-�)x(1-NEC2) ). To better understand the meaning of the aggregated degree of neceBMlJI NECM,U here, it is illuminating to study two special ca.ses: (1) 11�=0: this amounts to both factors being absent to the full. In this case NECMAX is just the maxim urn or the two degrees or necessity. ( 2) 11 ==l but 0<1<1: this is the situation in which the decision maker will conclude that factor F1 is completely fulfilled, but factor F2 is somewhat absent. In other words, the decision maker can neglect the first factor and focuses on the partial evidential matching with the second. Indeed, simple algebraic operations would reduce equation (30) to the partial matching relation (24) for factor F2. Very similar results can be derived for two con trary factors:
with CONTRMAX==l-min( ( 1-11) ><Bel( H IE)+'1 x( 1-CONTR 1) , (1-dxBei(H IE)+Ix(1-CONTR2) ).
As an ending remark in this section, the seque nee in which we aggregate all pieces of evidence should be identical to the sequence in which all factors were combined.
A View from Dempster-Shafer Theory
In the beginning of section 2, we related Bei(H IE) to the belief function in Dempster-Shafer theory. In this section, we shall examine the relation more comprehensively.
The major advantage of the D empster-Shafer theory, as stated in [ Gordon 1984[, is '' its ability to model the narrowing of the hypothesis set with the accumulation of evidence" in application to the diagnostic reasoning. Our purpose, being a bivalent deci sion making, we shall mainly benefit from a conse:juence of its generality. Specifically, the theory affords us to avoid the Baye sian restriction that the commitment of belief to a particular decision implies the commitment of the rest of belief to its nega tion; i.e. that Prob(H [E) .
To facilitate a partial interpretation of our model in view of the Dempster-Shafer theory, we shall first refer to some related con cepts in that theory, then try to compare our model with them. It should be noted here that a familiarity with the theory itself is assumed, and that the concept mentions in the sequel are pri marily meant to unify the notations before relating to our works.
Let us start with the frame of discernment 9, which, in our case, contains H and H only. Then the basic probability assignment (bpa) m will be such that m(H)+ m( ll) +m(9) =l.. Further more, over H and H we shall have belief function�� B(H) and B(H), which, as a special case in our situation, are identical to m(H) and m(ll) respectively. (Although the whole issue of belief versus plausibility is of fundamental importance in the theory, it is not essential for our purpose of interpretation and therefore will not be addressed here.)
Let B 1 and B2 denote two belief functions based on their bpa 's m1 and m2 respectively. Dempster's rule of combination will then calculate the combined effect of m1 and m2, which is denoted by mp m2. Based on this result, a combined belief function BpB2 can be trivially obtained in our case. (Since the beliefs and the bpa's will take the same value over the singletons H and H.) In [ Gordon 1984], several special cases in connection to MYCIN have been studied for the combined belief. For the purpose of reference in the sequel, we now rephrase two of them as follows:
Suppose B1(H)� and B2(H)=z0, (In other words, both beliefs support H only.) then the combined belief BPB2 according to Dempster's rule will be such that
On the other hand, if B1(ll)� and B2(H)=z0, which means the first belief supports H while the second sup ports ll, then the combined belief BPB2 becomes (33) It should be mentioned here that the sole purpose of the multiplication by 1 is to obtain a
1-B1(H) XB2(H)
normalized bpa. Therefore the multiplier will be referred to as the normalization factor.
We are now in a position to relate our formalism to these con cepts. As mentioned earlier, we may identify our degree of belief In the first place, let us demonstrate that under an additional assumption the Dempster's equation in (32) can be used to derive our formula in (10) for combining two supportive factors. To this end, the assumption we have to make is that the degree of support (SUPP) by the factor Fin our equation (2) can be equated to the belief BF(H) in Dempster-Shafer's terms. As a result of this equality, with the interpretations we made earlier, the upper equations in (8) and (9) may be rewritten as
(which exactly re-formulate the Dempster's equation in (32)). The next step is to recognize that our joint belief Bei(H IE, F is VH , F is VH ) is actually BJP[BFOBF J(H). To compute it, we can make use of the associativity in the gen eral Dempster's rule, (which can also been seen from (32) Before turning to cues involving adverse factors, it is useful to remark that the normalization factor in (33) can lead to counter intuitive results, aa haa been pointed out by [ Zadeh 1Q7Q ]. In fact, as mentioned earlier, our model corresponds to a.n unnor malized form of (33); that is, B{)B2(H)=B1(H)x{1-B2(/l)).
To establish this correspondence, we have to make the following assumption that, the degree of adversity (ADV) by the factor F in our equation (4) (This is all because of the associativity of Demspter's rule.) As a result, the counterpart of our combining formula in ( 14) is derived:
is wha.t we have claimed. By the same token, the case in which supportive factors are combined with adverse factors can also be established to validate our formula in ( 16).
To conclude this section, we note that, although a correspon dence exists between Dempster-Shafer's result and our model on the supportive and the adverse factors, the correspondence is certainly not a comprehensive one. Beside the fact that some additional assumptions were made in the process of argument, it is apparent that the concept of factor margins and that of partial 
Concluding Remark
In review of what we have presented in the context of subjective decision making, we started with a role classification system for all the decision factors. Each role of the factor has two margin values and an intensity to cast its peculiar influence on the final degree of belief. Then co . mbinations between factors were stu died. Based on the evidence/factor dichotomy, we embodied the concept of partial matching in the belief system and went on to derive corresponding equations for evidential aggregation.
Finally, we took certain interpretations and demonstrated the similarity to, and the distinction from Dempster-Shafer theory in special cases. Notwithstanding the apparant resemblance, it then became clear that the theory really addresses different issues than ours.
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It should be noted that the entirety of our belief system may such a linguistic, rather than numerical approach. Again, the extension to these fuzzy-set-based linguistic terms doesn't change the resulting formulae in our belief system.
To conclude, the rich semantics of the role system along with the computational belief mechanisms provide us with a deeper level of expression for factor causality. The versatile implications by kinds of evidence can now be drawn more naturally than using classical decision theories. Thus the integrity of a decision maker's cognitive structure may be better preserved, meriting the system a more realistic mentality.
